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Abstract. Neural networks are frequently used for image classification,
but can be vulnerable to misclassification caused by adversarial images.
Attempts to make neural network image classification more robust have
included variations on preprocessing (cropping, applying noise, blurring),
adversarial training, and dropout randomization. In this paper, we im-
plemented a model for adversarial detection based on a combination of
two of these techniques: dropout randomization with preprocessing ap-
plied to images within a given Bayesian uncertainty. We evaluated our
model on the MNIST dataset, using adversarial images generated us-
ing Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), Jacobian-based Saliency Map
Attack (JSMA) and Basic Iterative Method (BIM) attacks. Our model
achieved an average adversarial image detection accuracy of 97%, with
an average image classification accuracy, after discarding images flagged
as adversarial, of 99%. Our average detection accuracy exceeded that of
recent papers using similar techniques.
Keywords: Adversarial examples, Robust image classification, Bayesian
uncertainty, Image cropping.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNN) produce excellent image classification results and
are the current state-of-the-art, but have been shown to be vulnerable to attacks
by adversarial examples: Images altered by the introduction of small perturba-
tions that cause the neural network to misclassify the image [1].
Many researchers have proposed defenses against adversarial image attacks
on neural network classification systems. In image preprocessing defenses, the im-
ages are altered in some way before being classified (blurring, cropping, noise) in
order to disrupt any adversarial perturbations [6] [7]. In dropout randomization
defenses, as the name suggests, the neural network adds randomization which
supports the use of Bayesian uncertainty measurements to assess the likelihood
of an image being adversarial [3] [14].
Our model uses a combination defense: We base our model on Bayesian
uncertainty in a dropout neural network [17], but use a secondary defense, pre-
processing, as a double-check for “edge” cases. The existence of the secondary
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defense allows us to tune the uncertainty aspect of our defense in favor of declar-
ing “edge” images (images close to the threshold uncertainty) adversarial, with
less sacrifice of clean-image accuracy than would otherwise be the case.
2 Related Work
Feinman et al. [3] proposed a defense based on Bayesian uncertainty with dropout,
combined with kernel density estimation. They tested it with good results against
adversarial examples generated via the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [5],
Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [9], Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA)
[15], and C&W [1] attacks. They achieved ROC-AUC scores on sets of adversar-
ial images generated from the MNIST dataset ranging from 90.57% to 98.13%
depending on attack method. This approach took advantage of the uncertainty
estimates possible with dropout networks by assuming that the Bayesian un-
certainty will be greater for adversarial examples than for clean data, because
of the effect of the randomization on the necessarily precise perturbations. In
addition, they used a Gaussian Mixture Model to analyze the outputs of the last
hidden layer of their neural network, arguing that adversarial images will have
a different distribution than clean ones. They also incorporated a kernel density
estimate defense and evaluated their approach on MNIST [10], CIFAR-10 [8],
and SVHN [13] datasets.
Papernot and McDaniel [14] also presented an uncertainty based defense: A
model-agnostic system in which the uncertainty is based on the predictions of a
second, separate neural network which is used to train the classification network.
This defense showed good results for the MNIST dataset, tested with adversarial
images generated by FGSM, JSMA, and AdaDelta [2] attacks.
Several researchers have considered preprocessing based defenses against ad-
versarial examples. Graese, Rozsa, and Boult [6] explored several preprocessing
techniques with the MNIST dataset, tested with FGSM and Fast Gradient Value
(FGV) [16] attacks, and found the best results with cropping and resizing: 76%
and 78% accuracy for FGV and FGSM samples respectively, compared to 65%
and 68% for the next best “translation” technique on their raw model. Guo et
al. [7] tested cropping-resizing as well as other image transformations (image
quilting, JPEG compression, etc.) and found that cropping-resizing was “very
efficient” with accuracy up to 76% depending on the strength and method of
attack.
3 Methodology
Our method uses Bayesian uncertainty [4] [3] with a relatively low “adversarial”
threshold for initial assessments and corrects for false negatives using image pre-
processing. Our method involves a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) with
dropout which reports the Bayesian uncertainty of its classifications, but which
then takes multiple crops of images which fall near our threshold uncertainty
level and classifies each crop again using our CNN. The final classification or
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Algorithm 1: Detecting adversarial images during inferring time.
input : an image img, a high threshold H , a low threshold L, and a count of
agreed predictions C.
output: image label (clean or adversarial).
1 calculate img prediction;
2 calculate img uncertainty;
3 if uncertainty > H then
4 declare adversarial;
5 else
6 if uncertainty < L then
7 declare clean;
8 else
9 for 1:5 do
10 crop & resize img;
11 classify img;
12 if class = prediction then
13 increment counter;
14 end
15 end
16 if counter > C then
17 declare clean;
18 else
19 declare adversarial;
20 end
21 end
22 end
adversarial image indication is based on both the level of Bayesian uncertainty
and the agreement or lack thereof among the crops. Algorithm 1 illustrates the
procedure.
3.1 Computing Model Bayesian Uncertainty
Dropout was first introduced as a means of avoiding overfitting in deep neural
network training [17]. Dropout layers mean that some weights are randomly
zeroed out, that is, some links between neurons are cut. Gal and Ghahramani
[4] noted that including dropout layers in a neural network provides information
about uncertainty for a wide variety of DNN architectures, sometimes without
modification. Srivastava et al. [17] used dropout at training time, however Gal
and Ghahramani applied dropout to the inference stage.
Our model uses dropout layers in the inference stage: For each image, we
made N stochastic passes through the network. Each pass produced a proba-
bility for each available class by applying Softmax to the resulting logit vectors
z1(x), ..., zN (x).
To obtain the stochastic prediction, we take the mean of the logit vector z(x)
for each class. The image is provisionally classified as the class with the highest
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mean. We also obtain the stochastic uncertainty by computing the standard
deviation of the predictions over the N stochastic passes.
3.2 Image Preprocessing
At this point, if the stochastic uncertainty is sufficiently high, our model declares
the image adversarial without reference to the secondary method. If the uncer-
tainty is sufficiently low, our model outputs the provisional classification as the
final classification, again without reference to the secondary method. However,
if the uncertainty lies within a certain middle range, the model employs the
crop-resize secondary method.
In the cropping stage, the network takes any image which has been classified
with an uncertainty laying in the “edge” range, splits it into five overlapping
crops (top left, bottom left, top right, bottom right, and center), in the man-
ner of Graese et al. [6], and resizes each crop back to the original size. Each of
these crops is reclassified by the network, and if four out of the five new classi-
fications agree with the original, the image is not declared adversarial and the
original classification is output. This allows us to set the “threshold” Bayesian
uncertainty level low enough to risk a noticeable number of false negatives (clean
images declared adversarial) at the uncertainty stage of the process, while pro-
viding a mechanism to prevent these “extra” false negatives from making a large
impact on our model’s final accuracy. The lower uncertainty threshold level, in
turn, gives a greater chance of detecting borderline adversarial images.
4 Experiments
We implemented our model using Python 3.6 with CleverHans 2.0, TensorFlow,
Keras 2.0, Scikit-learn, OpenCV, and Pillow 5.1.0. CleverHans facilitates the
generation of adversarial examples using a variety of techniques. Using multiple
techniques to generate a set of adversarial images for testing allows us to assess
the general applicability of our defense. We trained and tested our model using
the MNIST dataset: a dataset of handwritten digits consisting of 60,000 training
examples and 10,000 test images. We tested our model with 50/50 mixed clean
and adversarial test sets for each of three attacks.
4.1 Neural Networks
For MNIST, we used the LeNet [11] convnet architecture. We used a dropout
rate of 0.5 after the last pooling layer and after the inner-product layer, as in [3].
On normal, non-adversarial samples, this network shows an accuracy of 98%.
4.2 Adversarial Attacks
We evaluated our model using three different methods of generating adversarial
images: FSGM [5], BIM [9], and JSMA [15].
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Table 1. Classification accuracy of undefended model.
FGSM JSMA BIM
Classification accuracy 59.0% 52.0% 50.0%
Table 2. Results for adversarial image detection.
FGSM JSMA BIM
False negative 252 85 249
False positive 134 74 104
True negative 4796 4856 4826
True positive 4725 4892 4728
Detection accuracy 96.1% 98.3% 96.4%
Table 3. Results of applying the defense with different attacks using MNIST dataset.
Attack
Clean images reported clean Adv. images reported clean Classification
AccuracyClassified
correctly
Classified
incorrectly
Classified
correctly
Classified
incorrectly
FGSM 97.3% 0.0% 1.7% 1.0% 99.0%
JSMA 98.5% 0.0% 1.4% 0.1% 99.9%
BIM 97.8% 0.0% 1.2% 1.0% 99.0%
5 Results
For our model, we adjusted the uncertainty levels based on the information gain
to improve accuracy and used these thresholds to calculate high and low levels of
Bayesian uncertainty. Our experiments also showed that requiring four out of five
crops be in agreement produced the greatest ultimate accuracy. We generated
adversarial images using FGSM, BIM, and JSMA, with separate test runs for
each attack.
We tested our model with a set of 10,000 images comprised of 50% clean
and 50% adversarial images. After testing with the basic, undefended CNN, we
removed clean images which were misclassified; in testing the defended model,
we used only adversarial images generated from images which were correctly
classified by the basic CNN when clean.
For the FGSM attack, as seen in Table 1, our basic CNN without defense had
an accuracy of 59% on the 50/50 mixed test set; most of adversarial images were
indeed misclassified. By adding our defense to the network, we were able to de-
tect adversarial images with an accuracy of 96.1% which increased classification
accuracy, for the images flagged as clean, to 99.0% (see Table 2 and 3).
Adversarial images produced using the BIM attack were even more successful
against the unprotected CNN, which was only 50% accurate on the mixed test
set. With our defense added, our model handled a BIM mixed test set with an
accuracy detecting adversarial images of 96.4% and a classification accuracy on
clean-flagged images of 99.0%.
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On a mixed test set produced with the JSMA attack, our basic CNN had
an accuracy of 52%. With our defense, our model achieved 99.9% classification
accuracy with 98.3% detection accuracy.
In all cases above, accuracy was calculated as <images correctly classified>/
<total remaining (flagged as clean) images>, and did not include images dis-
carded as adversarial. Detection accuracy was calculated using the <true positive
+ true negative>/<total images in set>. Total images now are less than 10,000
due to removal of misclassified clean images from consideration.
Feinman et al. [3] used a Bayesian uncertainty model, but combined it with
kernel density rather than preprocessing. With MNIST, they achieved mixed test
set adversarial sample detection ROC-AUC scores of 90.57% for FGSM, 97.23%
for BIM-A, and 98.13% for JSMA, slightly lower than the detection accuracy
results for our model. On average, Feinman et al. achieved an MNIST detec-
tion ROC-AUC of 95.31%, somewhat lower than our average MNIST detection
accuracy of 97%.
Graese, Rozsa, and Boult [6] tested their techniques with the FGSM at-
tack, but did not consider BIM nor JSMA attacks. For their 5-crops-and-resize
method they reported a classification accuracy of 90.94% for FGSM, noticeably
lower than our combined model results of 99.0% for that attack, however their
binarization defense had a comparable accuracy of 99.21%.
Wang et al. [18] applied a set of mutations, obtained by imposing a minor ran-
dom but realistic perturbation on the image. Based on their observation, clean
images preserved their labels while adversarial did not. They scored, on average,
88.0% for MNIST detection. Ma et al. [12] used Local Intrinsic Dimensional-
ity (LID) to characterize the dimensional properties of adversarial subspaces
or adversarial regions which facilitates the distinction of adversarial examples.
For MNIST, on average, they scored 96.20% accuracy, slightly lower than our
average.
6 Conclusion
Our combined Bayesian uncertainty and image pre-processing proved effective,
with accuracy in the high 90s, at detecting adversarial examples in a mixed
MNIST test set. This allowed for considerably higher accuracy in classifying the
remaining, primarily clean, images. Our model has shown results which are for
the most part similar to those of other recent work, with slightly greater accuracy
in adversarial example detection for the test sets and attacks we considered.
Future work in those areas could be promising, as our results suggest that
a combined defense has some advantages. In particular, it would be interesting
to explore a combination method that involves binarization in the manner of
Graese et al. Also, future work in defenses against additional attack methods
could shed light on the general applicability of this combined method.
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